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1. Introduction
Catch discarding, i.e., the throwing back overboard of unwanted sh, is a feature of
most, if not all, marine capture sheries. While discarding represents rational behaviour
by shermen, in response to physical constraints such as hold capacity or management
constraints such as quotas, it is a non-trivial problem for shery managers since subsequent
survival rates for sh are generally very low (e.g., Alverson et al. 1994). As well as
being economically wasteful, discarding therefore means that rates of shing mortality
will exceed those indicated by observed levels of sh landings, making the achievement of
conservation targets di¢ cult.
Although not a new problem, discarding has acquired signicant public prominence in
recent years. In Europe, for example, discards have become symbolic of a perceived
failure of the European Unions Common Fisheries Policy (CFP) to achieve sustainable
management of European sh stocks. In its last Green Paper on the future of the CFP
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(CEC 2009), the European Commission identied discards as a major problem and the
European Commissioner for Maritime A¤airs and Fisheries has recently announced the
intention to introduce an EU-wide ban on discards from 2014. At the same time, it
is apparent that quotas, which (as currently applied) create incentives to discard, will
remain the cornerstone of conservation policy within the EU for the foreseeable future.
What is unclear, however, is exactly how economic incentives in the shery can be adjusted
so that behaviour which is entirely rational can be prevented or avoided. In particular,
unless shing can be (costlessly) selective, making discarding more costly than retaining
sh on board raises questions about the design of a multispecies quota system and the
ability to enforce quotas at the landing site (the usual point of control). Although quota-
related discarding is not yet illegal in Europe (as it is in Norway) there have been trials
in the UK and Denmark of schemes to encourage a voluntary discard ban (backed
up by on-board camera monitoring) in return for increased quota allowances - so-called
catch quotaschemes. While these trial schemes have been reported as being successful
in reducing discards (e.g., MMO 2012), it is uncertain whether such a system can be
extended to an entire EU eet which already experiences quota compliance problems.
A number of studies have examined and characterised the incentives for shermen to
discard at sea rather than to retain and land a part of the catch in response to both
management and technological constraints (Anderson 1994, Arnason 1994, Vestergaard
1996, Hatcher 2005b). In essence, discarding is rational wherever the (opportunity) cost of
retaining and landing sh exceeds its market value (for a review, see Pascoe 1997). Other
studies have focused more generally on the relationship between the harvest technology
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and the feasibility of harvest policies implemented by a regulator (Turner 1997, Herrera
2005, Singh and Weninger 2009, Holland 2010). A notable omission from previous studies
has been a consideration of the costs to shermen (in the form of expected penalties)
of non-compliance with management targets, including both quotas and the regulation
of discards. This observation can be extended to the relatively small number of studies
which have addressed the determination of quota prices in multispecies ITQ sheries
(e.g., Vestergaard 1999, Dupont et al. 2005, Newell, Sanchirico and Kerr 2005, Singh and
Weninger 2009, Holland 2010). Since compliance with quotas must be assured through
a system of monitoring and enforcement, there is an inevitable relationship between the
quota price and the expected penalty for non-compliance with quotas (Chavez and Salgado
2005, Hatcher 2005a). Given that quota compliance is normally monitored at the point
of landing, however, this relationship also needs to encompass any costs associated with
discarding at sea.
The present paper aims to extend our understanding of discard behaviour and quota
markets in multispecies quota-managed sheries by explicitly considering the costs of
non-compliance with both quotas and discard bans as well as the costs of selective shing
(or avoidance). We give particular consideration to a situation in which one or more TACs
becomes binding (or restrictive) at a lower level of individual and aggregate e¤ort than
do the other TACs, resulting (at the vessel level) in individual quotas which are restrictive
or, in the case of ITQs, supply inelastic. Species for which quotas are thus restrictive in
a shery are often referred to as chokespecies.
In the paper we focus on the incentives for legal and illegal rm behaviour in relation to
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quotas and discard controls in a multispecies shery and the resulting implications for
quota markets. In order to do so we conne our attention to a static model of industry
prot maximisation, implicitly taking stock sizes as xed. We do not consider the broader
issues of the growth and predator-prey interactions between species in a dynamic setting.
While these issues are important, our interest is in shermens behaviour in relation to
the management targets and instruments actually chosen by regulators, rather than the
determination of optimal (rst-best) policies for the shery.1 Our focus on the static
incentive structure of regulation nevertheless enables signicant insight into the problems
facing managers of multispecies sheries.
We begin by setting up a simple deterministic model of a multispecies, quota-regulated,
shery in which we assume that both over-quota landings and discards can be deterred by
means of a unit penalty imposed by the regulator. The basic shing technology is assumed
to be joint in inputs (see, for example, Vestergaard 1999). More strictly, in the absence of
additional inputs committed to avoidance or selective shing, species are caught in xed
proportions depending upon their relative abundance on the shing grounds, which we
assume is constant. With the addition of costly avoidance inputs, the yields of one or
more species can be reduced and the technology is then characterised by weak output
disposability(Turner 1997, Singh and Weninger 2009). We go on to examine the impact
of a discard ban on vessels prot maximising behaviour, in particular where species
quotas are not set in proportion to the availability of species on the shing grounds,
considering rstly non-tradeable quotas and then a shery managed using a tradeable
1 In taking this approach we follow a number of previous studies, including Anderson (1994), Arnason (1994),
Vestergaard (1996), Hatcher (2005b) and Abbott and Wilen (2009).
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quota (ITQ) system. We proceed to show the necessary interdependence between the
(expected) penalty rates for discards and for over-quota landings in determining vessel
behaviour and hence quota market outcomes. Under an e¤ective discard ban, for example,
we expect the quota price for choke species to be bid up to the level of the expected penalty
for illegal (over-quota) landings. A nal section concludes.
2. Model and analysis
2.1 Basic rm model
We model a shery in which an assemblage of n species of sh are caught together by a
large number of competitive shing rms, each operating a single vessel. In a given period,
a representative shing vessels catch qi of species i is given by qi (e; a), where e is shing
e¤ort(a technologically e¢ cient vector of variable inputs) and a represents additional
inputs required in order to reduce the yield of certain species, i.e., to sh selectively. We
assume the harvest technology is such that
qie > 0; qiee  0; qia  0; qiea  0; i = 1; 2; :::; n;
with the last two derivatives strictly negative for at least one species. Thus, shing
selectively (or avoidance) with a > 0 implies that total and marginal yields of at least
one (but clearly not all) species are reduced. Otherwise, it is implicitly the case that
the species are caught in xed proportions (according to their relative abundance on the
shing grounds). Variable harvesting costs are given by c (e; a), with, we assume,
ce; cee > 0; ca; caa > 0; cea = cae = 0:
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We allow for the possibility of a tradeable quota (ITQ) regime under which, at market
equilibrium, individual vessel quotas Qi for the ith species are traded at lease prices ri.2
Otherwise, individual quotas are non-tradeable (INTQs, or simply IQs). Compliance with
quotas is enforced at the point of landing, with over-quota landings of species i attracting
an expected unit cost (penalty)  i > 0.
3 We make the additional, not unreasonable,
assumption that  i is greater than the rst-sale price for the sh. With discards di,
landings of species i are given by qi ()   di and non-compliance is therefore dened as
qi ()  di > Qi. Fish discarded at sea prior to landing incur an expected unit cost !i  0,
depending upon the implementation (and e¤ectiveness) of a discard ban.4
With rst-sale prices pi,5 the vessel operators short run (expected) prot maximisation
problem is6
max
e;a;d;Q
X
i
pi [qi (e; a)  di]  c (e; a) 
X
i
riQi
 
X
i
 i [qi (e; a)  di  Qi] 
X
i
!idi: (1)
2 In the case of an ITQ system, we assume that the vessel is also representative of aggregate e¤ort in the shery,
so that the vessels quota demands at market equilibrium mirror inverse quota demands in the shery as a whole
(see Singh and Weninger 2009, Hatcher 2012).
3 The expected penalty rate is simply the product of the penalty rate set by the regulator and the rms subjective
probability of incurring the penalty (i.e., the risk of detection and sanction).
4 The assumption of constant expected marginal penalties is perhaps unrealistic, but is convenient for a simple
illustration of the relevance of costs for illegal behaviour in determining quota market outcomes. For a discussion
of non-linear penalty functions, see Hatcher (2005a).
5 We assume that the species index i completely describes the heterogeneity in the catch. Thus we abstract from
any variation in prices within species.
6 For simplicity, we assume that vessels have a zero quota endowment at the beginning of each period. For a
competitive rm this makes no di¤erence to the marginal conditions and hence has no impact on the results. This
would not be the case if we were to consider the exercise of market power in the quota market (see Hatcher 2012).
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The rst order conditions for e; a; di ; Q

i > 0 are then respectivelyX
i
[pi    i] qie = ce > 0; (2a)X
i
[pi    i] qia = ca > 0; (2b)
 i   pi = !i; i = 1; 2; :::; n; (2c)
ri =  i; i = 1; 2; :::; n: (2d)
Note that in (2a) we must have at least one of the terms [pi    i] qie strictly positive for
vessel activity (e > 0). In (2b) we have a similar requirement for a positive level of
avoidance e¤ort a, which requires that  i > pi where qia < 0. From (2c) it is apparent
that banning discards requires that  i   pi < !i always holds as an inequality, i.e., the
marginal cost of discarding (!i) must always exceed the cost of landing ( i   pi). If
!i = 0, then the discard condition is given by  i   pi = 0, which means that any species
of sh with a positive expected cost of landing will be discarded at sea. If quotas are
tradeable, we can see from (2d) that the  i (the unit penalties for landing sh without
quota) will form ceilings on quota prices. If quotas are not tradeable, then the Qi are no
longer choice variables and the nal set of rst order conditions disappear accordingly.
2.2 Non-tradeable individual catch quotas
IQs with a discard ban
If a non-tradeable quota is exceeded at the point of control, i.e., if for species i we have
qi ()  di > Qi, then by assumption the associated  i is positive. If we have an e¤ective
discard ban, implying that the !i are of su¢ cient magnitude to ensure that di = 0;8i,
7
then there are just two possible prot-maximising outcomes. One is where condition (2b)
does not hold, which implies that selective shing is not protable and hence a = 0.
Either sh are landed over-quota, with a penalty incurred, or e¤ort is not expanded
beyond the point at which the quota is lled: this will depend upon the magnitude of  i.
The other possible outcome is where (2b) does hold, which implies that it is protable to
sh selectively (a > 0), reducing the yield of the species for which the quota is restrictive.
Again, by restrictive we mean that, if shing is non-selective, this quota binds at a lower
level of shing e¤ort e than do the other quotas. This implies that quotas are not set
in proportion to the relative availability of species on the shing ground (otherwise, all
quotas would bind at the same level of - non-selective - e¤ort).
Assume, for example, that in a two-species shery (i = 1; 2) the quota for species 1 is
restrictive in this sense and let the value of !1 be arbitrarily large, so that there is no
discarding. From (2a) and (2c), the optimal level of e¤ort e solves
!1 >  1   p1 =
1
q1e
[p2q2e   ce] > 0: (3)
The LHS of the equality in (3) is the marginal cost of landing sh of species 1 illegally
(i.e., over-quota), while the RHS of the equality is the marginal cost of reducing the catch
of species 1 by reducing shing e¤ort, including the associated loss in the value of catches
of species 2 (for which the vessel still has quota). We can re-write the equality in (3) as
p1q1e + p2q2e   ce =  1q1e > 0; (4)
to see that e¤ort is e¤ectively constrained by the quota for species 1 (depending upon the
value of  1).
8
From (2b) and (2c), we obtain the condition for a > 0 as
!1 >  1   p1 =  
ca
q1a
+ p2
q2a
q1a
> 0: (5)
Again, the LHS of the equality in (5) is the marginal cost of landing sh of species 1
illegally. The rst term on the RHS of the equality is the marginal cost of reducing the
catch of species 1 by shing selectively. If q1a < 0, then this is positive. The second term
on the RHS of the equality is the associated marginal loss in revenue from a change in the
yield of species 2. Assuming that q1a < 0, this is positive if q2a < 0. If q2a = 0 (selectivity
has no impact on the yield of species 2) then (5) reduces to
!1 >  1   p1 =  
ca
q1a
> 0: (6)
In this case, the optimal levels of shing e¤ort and avoidance jointly solve
p2q2e = ce   ca q1e
q1a
> 0 (7)
(note that this does not imply that the catch of species 1 is reduced to zero). Equation
(7) equates the marginal revenue from species 2 with the marginal cost of e¤ort and the
cost of avoidance for the marginal yield of species 1.
IQs with discarding
If, in our two species example, !1 = 0, then provided  1   p1 > 0 the optimal level of
e¤ort simply solves
p2q2e = ce; (8)
where the marginal catch of species 1 is discarded entirely once the quota is lled. The
optimality condition for avoidance becomes
p2q2a = ca  0: (9)
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If q2a  0, this implies that a = 0: there is no incentive to sh selectively when discarding
is costless.7
If the expected discarding cost !1 is positive, but is nevertheless smaller than the expected
cost of landing over quota, i.e., if we have 0 < !1 <  1   p1, then optimal e¤ort solves
p2q2e   ce = !1q1e > 0: (10)
Here, all over-quota sh of species 1 are again discarded rather than landed, but e¤ort is
now constrained by the (expected) cost of discarding. If avoidance is prot-maximising,
then assuming q2a = 0 the optimal levels of shing e¤ort and avoidance jointly solve (7)
as before.
2.3 Tradeable catch quotas (ITQs)
ITQs with a discard ban
Under an ITQ system, quota prices cannot exceed  i, the expected penalty for landing
sh without quota. For a discard ban to be e¤ective, it must always be more costly
to discard than it is to land sh (with or without quota). Thus, we require (expected)
penalty rates !i and  i such that
!i >  i   pi  ri   pi (11)
7 If we had q2a > 0, i.e., if selective shing increased the (absolute) yield of species 2, then selective e¤ort would
of course be protable even though over-quota sh of species 1 can be costlessly discarded. If this were the case,
however, we might presume that the additional inputs would become part of the normal prot maximising
vector of shing e¤ort inputs e.
10
and hence
 i  ri: (12)
If ri =  i, the vessel will be indi¤erent between landing sh legally and illegally, although
we assume (as is conventional) that in this case the vessel will land legally if it is possible
to do so, i.e., to purchase quota at this price. Given this, a vessels optimal level of shing
e¤ort is where X
i
[pi   ri] qie = ce  0; (13)
in which, for a non-trivial solution (e > 0 and hence ce > 0), we must have at least one
of the terms [pi   ri] qie strictly positive.
With two species, we can write the rst order condition for e¤ort as
[p1   ~r1] q1e + [p2   ~r2] q2e = ce > 0; (14)
where it is implicitly assumed that the market for both quotas just clears at the same level
of e¤ort. We denote the corresponding equilibrium quota prices 0 < ~ri < pi; 8i. Consider,
though, what will happen if the supply of species 1 quota becomes inelastic to vessels at
a lower level of e¤ort than is the case for species 2 quota (this is equivalent to saying that
the TAC for species 1 is restrictive, in the sense introduced in the previous section, for the
industry as a whole). If the value of  1 is su¢ ciently low that it is nevertheless protable
for vessels to expand e¤ort further to clear the market for species 2 quota, landing species
1 sh without quota if necessary, then vessels will be willing to pay up to  1 for species
1 quota and will be indi¤erent between holding quota and paying the penalty for landing
over-quota sh of species 1.8 With r1 thus bid up to equal  1, at the optimal level of
8 This will not be the case for all specications of the expected penalty function, however. For a discussion of the
signicance of penalties for relative violations in particular, see Hatcher (2005a, 2012).
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e¤ort we will then have
[p1    1] q1e + [p2   r^2] q2e = ce; (15)
where the rst term on the LHS is now negative. Assuming for the moment that a = 0,
for each vessel (and in aggregate), then there is a unique level of shing e¤ort e that will
just clear the market for species 2 quota, and from (14) and (15), since we have the same
value of ce, we must then have r^2 < ~r2. All else equal, therefore, the e¤ect of the restrictive
quota on species 1 is to reduce the equilibrium quota price for species 2. The reason for
this is simply that the value of the marginal catch of species 2 is reduced, reecting the
fact that it is now more costly to land the associated marginal catch of species 1.
If, on the other hand, the expected penalty rate  1 is high enough to prevent e¤ort
expanding further once the quota supply for species 1 becomes inelastic, then there will
be excess supply of species 2 quota, with the result that the equilibrium quota price for
species 2 is zero. A vessels optimal level of e¤ort then solves
[p1   r1] q1e + p2q2e = ce; (16)
since we assume that, for any greater level of e¤ort (increasing the catch of species 1) we
will have [p1    1] q1e+ p2q2e < ce (note the implicit discontinuity in the marginal benet
function).
In our two-species example, the condition for positive avoidance e¤ort with respect to
species 1 is
!1 >  1   p1  r1   p1 =  
ca
q1a
  [r2   p2] q2a
q1a
; (17)
where the LHS of the equality is the cost of landing sh of species 1. To simplify things,
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let q2a = 0 as before, so that (17) reduces to
!1 >  1   p1  r1   p1 =  
ca
q1a
> 0: (18)
Assuming that q1a < 0, selective shing only becomes a rational choice if r1 > p1. Other-
wise, it is optimal to sh non-selectively and (assuming a discard ban is e¤ective) to land
all the catch. If selective shing is prot-maximising, then from (14) and (18), optimal
e¤ort and avoidance then jointly solve
[p2   r2] q2e = ce   [p1   r1] q1e = ce   ca q1e
q1a
> 0; (19)
which, notice, is formally similar to (7). Given q2a = 0, we can continue to assume that
the market for species 2 quota clears at the same level of (aggregate) e¤ort, and since
(15) continues to hold, this again implies that the quota price for species 2 is reduced due
to the restrictive TAC on species 1. Di¤erentiating through (15) by a and rearranging,
however, we obtain
@r2
@a
= [p1    1]
q1ea
q2e
> 0 (20)
which uses cea = q2ea = 0 and is signed given p1 <  1 (as we have assumed) and q1ea < 0.
All else equal, therefore, avoidance e¤ort on species 1 increases the species 2 quota price.
ITQs with discarding
With !1 = 0, from (2c) and (2d) the discard condition for species 1 is r1 = p1. It is
apparent, however, that with costless discarding the equilibrium quota price for species 1
can never rise above p1, since there is no demand for quota at a price where the revenue
from landing sh falls below zero. Given (17), therefore, selective e¤ort cannot be prot
maximising if discarding is costless.
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If, however, we have 0 < !1 <  1   p1, then the quota price ceiling for species 1 becomes
!1 + p1 <  1. In this case a positive level of selective shing e¤ort is clearly prot-
maximising (depending upon the marginal cost of avoidance).
2.4 Note: discards counted against quotas
If discards are permitted, but their volume (by species) can be monitored and counted
against a vessels quota holdings, then the di arguments disappear from the quota penalty
function in (1) and we have !i = 0. The rst order conditions for di > 0 then change to
simply
pi = 0; i = 1; 2; :::; n: (21)
Given this (rather strong) assumption, under either IQs or ITQs vessels have no incentive
to discard any sh having a positive market price. The results are then exactly the same
as in the case of an e¤ective discard ban.
3. Summary and conclusion
We have examined the implications of a discard ban in a multispecies quota shery, in
particular the e¤ects on rms prot-maximising behaviour and on equilibrium quota
prices under an ITQ system. The focus has been on discarding in response to inelastic
quota supply for so-called chokespecies, arising from a discrepancy between the pro-
portions in which TACs are imposed for di¤erent species and their relative abundance
on the shing grounds. We have shown that quota market outcomes depend crucially
upon the relative costs of discarding and over-quota landings. It is simply not possible
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to model the formation of quota prices in an ITQ shery without explicitly considering
rm behaviour in relation to the quota compliance policies implemented by regulators:
equilibrium quota prices are sensitive to the expected marginal penalties for both discards
and illegal landings as well as to input and output prices.
We have seen that, in the case of non-tradeable quotas (such as individual vessel quotas),
an e¤ective discard ban, if it can be imposed, results either in the chokespecies being
landed illegally, or in the e¤ective constraint of shing e¤ort to the point at which the
TAC for the choke species binds upon the industry. Which outcome prevails then depends
upon the magnitude of the (expected) penalty rate for over-quota landings. A successful
discard ban implies a (prohibitively large) expected cost for discarding over-quota sh and,
depending upon the size of expected penalties for illegal landings, this will create incentives
for selective shing (avoidance). If discarding is costless, on the other hand, all choke
species will simply be discarded once the corresponding TAC binds: there is no constraint
on shing e¤ort and no incentive for costly avoidance. An expected discarding cost that
is positive, but less than the expected cost for illegal landing, can create incentives for
avoidance e¤ort but will not eliminate discards of the choke species.
Under an ITQ system, when a choke species TAC becomes binding upon the industry
the supply of quota becomes inelastic to the individual vessel. With a discard ban, the
corresponding quota price will be bid up to the level of the expected penalty for illegal
landings, at which point vessels are indi¤erent between landing legally and illegally.9 If
the expected penalty for illegal landings is high enough, shing e¤ort is constrained to
9 Holland (2010) notes that this quota price ination may not be observed in practice, for example in the case of
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where the choke species TAC just binds. Otherwise, ination of the quota price for the
choke species (up to the level of the expected penalty for over-quota landings) results
in lower equilibrium quota prices for other species. Under ITQs, selective shing only
becomes protable (depending on the marginal costs of avoidance) once the quota price
exceeds the dockside (landing) price. Avoidance e¤ort reduces the costs to the vessel from
catching the choke species and so increases economic prots and hence the quota price
for other species.
With costless discarding, the quota price for the choke species can never rise above the
dockside price and the additional cost of selective shing e¤ort is never protable. A pos-
itive but small (expected) discarding cost (less than the expected cost of illegal landing),
on the other hand, inates the quota price for the choke species above the market price
and makes avoidance e¤ort potentially protable.
The imposition of a discard ban appears to be a logical and uncontroversial step in re-
ducing economic waste in a multispecies quota shery. Even assuming that it is techno-
logically feasible to monitor all discards, however, so that vessels can expect to incur a
signicant cost if they discard, the implications may not be straightforward. Specically,
the alternatives to discarding are either an increase in illegal (i.e., over-quota) landings,
or more selective shing, or the constraint of shing e¤ort to the level at which the most
restrictive TAC (the choke species) becomes binding on the industry. As we have seen,
which outcome predominates depends upon the expected costs and benets of each al-
choke species in the B.C. groundsh trawl shery. At the shery level the explanation is reported as an agreement
amongst participants not to engage in gouging (charging very high prices for scarce quota). An alternative
explanation would be that the expected penalties for landing choke species without quota are not, in reality, very
high.
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ternative, and in particular, the marginal costs of landing over-quota sh and of avoiding
catches of the choke species. Whether or not a discard ban is potentially welfare improv-
ing in any given situation, therefore, will depend on a number of complex factors, of which
the regulatory cost of imposing such a ban is but one.
Finally, looking at the problem of quota-induceddiscarding of choke species from the
regulators perspective, an heuristic approach to reducing the volume of discards would be
to set TACs in proportions closer to the average observed ratios of species in the harvest.
This raises questions relating to the scientic and political rationale and processes around
setting TACs in multispecies (and often multi-national) sheries which lie beyond the
scope of the paper. There may be trade-o¤s, for example, between setting a rst-best
TAC for a particular species and setting a di¤erent TAC which leads to lower rates of
discards and/or illegal landings in the shery.
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